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AGGREGATION, SETTLEMENT, AND DISMAY
Judith Resnikt
I
MARCUS AND COFFEE ON JUDICIAL HANDIWORK:
CHANGING SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE VIA THE
CLASS ACTION RULE
Richard Marcus and Jack Coffee argue that federal judges are re-
lying on the class action rule (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23) to
revamp both substance and procedure.' Both papers represent at-
tempts to link the efforts of lawyers and judges across an array of cases
and to provide a coherent picture of the emerging new rules and doc-
trine, both substantive and procedural. Coffee and Marcus strive to
place a series of federal mass tort class action litigations in a broader
t All rights reserved. Orrin B. Evans Professor of Law, University of Southern Cali-
fornia Law Center. This comment was prepared for the Symposium entitled Mass Tortes:
Serving Just Desserts, held at Cornell Law School in October of 1994 and responds to
presentations by Professors Coffee and Marcus. Professor Marcus's paper and a summary
of Professor Coffee's paper appear at 80 CoRNELL L REv'. 858 (1995) and 80 CoRNErL. L.
REv. 851 (1995), respectively. Professor Coffee's complete paper will appear at 95 COLUM.
L. REv. (forthcoming 1995). The references hereafter are to the draft of October, 1994
upon which I was asked to comment.
Like many of those who write in this Symposium, I have participated in some fashion
in a few of the activities that form the basis for discussion. Along with Professor Thomas D.
Rowe, Jr., I provided an opinion letter to the 1991 Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos of the
Judicial Conference of the United States (sometimes called the "Rehnquist" Committee, in
reference to the Chief Justice's request for its creation, or the "Reavley" committee, in
reference to its chair, Judge Reavley). I have also served as a court-appointed expert in a
class action ERISA litigation; served (with Dennis Curtis) as an attorney on behalf of indi-
vidually retained plaintiffs' attorneys in a multidistrict litigation about a hotel fire; was
briefly consulted by objectors in the asbestos future class litigation; and have represented
prisoners in civil rights class actions. I am also a consultant to RAND's Institute for Civil
Justice and a member of the American Law Institute.
My thanks to Denny Curtis, Deborah Hensler, George Priest, John Langbein, Stephen
Yeazell, Harvey Nachman, Richard Bieder, and Stephen Wizner, from and with whom I
have learned a good deal about large scale cases and the needs, interests, incentives, and
concerns of litigants, lawyers, and judges involved. Thanks also to Patricia Howard and
Robert A. Cahn, Clerk and Executive Attorney for the Multidistrict Litigation Panel, both
of whom provided and explained data to me, as well as to Steven Vaughan and Gregory
Porter for wonderful research assistance.
1 John C. Coffee,Jr., The Corruption of the Class Action. The New Technology of Collusiom
Discussion Draft of October 1994 [hereinafter Coffee, Collusion Draft]. See alsoJohn C.
Coffee, Jr., Summary, The Corruption of the Class Action: The New Technology of Collusion, 80
CoRNuiL L Rxv. 851 (1995) [hereinafter Coffee, Summary];John C. Coffee,Jr., Class Wars:
The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. R-v. (forthcoming October 1995);
Richard L. Marcus, They Can't Do That, Can They? Tort Reform Via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L.
Rxv. 858 (1995).
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context, in an effort to understand a phenomenon rather than a particu-
lar case.
As Marcus explains, while Congress has not (as of this writing)
enacted any of the various legislative proposals for tort reform, federal
judges have functionally undertaken "tort reform" through their work
under Rule 23. That is, judges have approved (and, to varying ex-
tents, designed) class action settlements that eliminate punitive dam-
ages;2 created priorities of rights by staggering the processing of
claims and categorizing the values of claims; recognized to some ex-
tent a tort of fear of future injury;3 altered standards of proof of causa-
tion and injury; and capped payments.4 Professor Coffee would add a
few other items to this list of federal judicial innovations-that judges
have imposed new requirements on eligibility for compensation, ex-
cluded lesser injuries from compensation, and sanctioned the queu-
ing of claimants so that only a certain number of claims are paid in a
given year.5
Marcus analogizes federal judicial handiwork to Congress's black
lung program.6 To me, prioritizing categories of claimants and sched-
uling benefits is reminiscent of bankruptcy proceedings and certain
forms of administrative adjudicatory remedies. As I described in a
1991 essay (From "Cases" to "Litigation"'), by creating "claims facilities"
to administer payment schemes, the judiciary has crafted a series of
entities akin to mini-agencies, empowered by court orders to imple-
ment compensation schemes. Whatever analogies are chosen for the
judiciary's work, many of the parallels come from congressional
statutes.
Jack Coffee in turn explores how, via Rule 23, federal judges are
altering incentives and affecting the relative negotiating power of par-
2 Marcus, supra note 1, at 870, 875. Marcus also points out that federal judges differ
in the degree to which they overtly embrace such a role. See e.g., Jack B. Weinstein &
Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort Law, 1991 U. ILI- L. REv. 269, 302-16;
cf. Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 1387 (3d Cir.) (declining to abolish punitive damages de
jure because of the undesirability ofjudicial resolution of such "policy" issues), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 650 (1993). See genera//yJACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDVIDUAL JUSTCE IN MASS TORT
LTIGATION (1995).
3 Marcus describes the federal courts as having "abolish [ed] or curtail[ed] claims for
fear of future harm." Marcus, supra note 1, at 870. Alternatively, one could describe some
federal courts, along with a minority of states, as recognizing such claims. See Coffee, Col-
lusion Draft, supra note 1, at 16-17. Memorandum from Roger C. Cramton to the Partici-
pants in the Cornell Law School Colloquium on Mass Tort Litigation (Sept. 19, 1994, with
addendum/corrections of Sept. 27, 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter Cramton
Memorandum of Sept. 19, 1994].
4 See Marcus, supra note 1, at 870.
5 Coffee, Collusion Draft, supra note 1, at 34.
6 Marcus, supra note 1, at 870.
7 Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation, "LAw & CowmEmp. PROBS., Summer 1991,
at 5, 63.
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ties. According to Coffee, class actions used to be understood as a
potent plaintiffs'weapon, creating a means of leveraging power against
defendants.8 Coffee argues that now, in the context of mass tort set-
tlement class actions (in which certification is linked to classwide set-
tlement), Rule 23 has become a tool of defendants. 9 Coffee sketches
the search for what the jargon now calls "global settlements,"'0 de-
sired by a judiciary anxious about both the volume of individual tort
actions and defendants' projections of the exhaustion of funds from
which compensation can be paid.
8 Coffee, Collusion Draft, supra note 1, at 2.
9 As Coffee puts it, Rule 23 class actions are becoming "not a sword for plaintiffs, but
a shield for defendants." Coffee, Collusion Draft, supra note 1, at 3. Coffee does not ex-
plain why this role reversal is troubling, aside from its "historic reversal in the role of the
class action." Id.
One might argue against procedural rules being either "pro" plaintiff or "pro" defen-
dant and for rules to be "neutral" as between plaintiff and defendant. As I have detailed
elsewhere, a good deal of civil procedural rulemaking (as contrasted with criminal proce-
dural rulemaking) is animated by the assumption of procedural neutrality. That assumption
is in turn linked to others-that neutrality comes either by virtue of rules that operate
evenhandedly, regardless of whether one's position is that of plaintiff or defendant, or by
virtue of the presumed interchangeability of civil plaintiffs and defendants. Were litigants
interchangeable, i.e. today a plaintiff, tomorrow a defendant, any biases in rules might
wash out over time. SeeJudith Resnik, The Domain of Courts, 137 U. PA. L REv. 2219, 2225-
26 (1988). As I discussed in that essay, however, in some segments of the litigation world,
certain groups of people or entities do not routinely swap sides.
Coffee also does not fully explain why, if "plaintiffs... typically fare better today in
individual actions," that advantage should be the baseline from which to measure contem-
porary innovation-and to find aggregate processing wanting and in need of restructuring
to give "special protections" to plaintiffs. Coffee, Collusion Draft, supra note 1, at 3. Coffee
seems to argue that plaintiffs are better served by the incentives of an individualized system
because those incentives produce more intensified struggle. Id. at 4. While he admits that
an individualized system may also work "poorly," he argues that class treatment only "aggra-
vates" the problems. Id. at 9.
For discussion of arguments for individualization, see Judith Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis
& Deborah R Hensler, Individuals within the Aggregate: Representation and Fees, forthcoming
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1995 [hereinafter Resnik, Curtis & Hensler, Individuals within the Aggregate].
10 Coffee's discussion about whether one can accurately capture the interests involved
in large scale mass torts with the nomenclature of "plaintiffs" and "defendants" is question-
able; neither are unitary groups. On particular issues, their interests may diverge. Else-
where I have discussed that, rather than a pyramid, this litigation is better conceptualized
as a Calder mobile. See Judith Resnik, History, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts, Selected
Memories and Limited Imagination, The Edward Donley Lecture, - W. VA. L. REv. (forthcom-
ing 1995); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatmy Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHi. L. REV.
494, 502 n.30 (1986); see also Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of Mass
Torts: Wien the Rules Meet the Road, 80 CoRNmLL L. REv. 1159, 1161 (1995).
Coffee's claim that "defendants have little reason to encourage the use of class ac-
tions" in contexts when individual stakes are low is also questionable. Coffee, Collusion
Draft, supra note 1, at 5. I wonder both about the empirical bases of this assumption and
also about whether variation might exist among defendants or based on the kind of case
involved. Cf Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REv. 497 (1991) (discussing incentives of securities litigants). It is
at least plausible that defendants might want to settle and avoid future litigation in con-
texts other than torts. Cf Coffee, Collusion Draft, supra note 1, at 39.
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Coffee outlines the interests of the judiciary, whom he describes
as awed by the volume of individual yet similar tort claims and there-
fore in quest of modes of speedy disposition. He argues that judicial
agendas augment the power of the defendants, whom he describes as
"fast learners"" and who offer judges some comfort via global settle-
ments-a deal that presumably lays to rest, in one fell swoop, whatever
problems are at hand.
12
The sources of the power of "players"-judges and plaintiffs' law-
yers-are key to Coffee's story. Judicial power stems not only from the
class action rule but also from the federal statute conferring power on
the Panel for Multidistrict Litigation ("MDL") to consolidate cases
from different federal districts.' 3 The panel has emerged as a potent
force; its ability to consolidate federal cases includes the power to halt
proceedings in pending cases by ordering that they be transferred to a
judge assigned to handle the multidistrict litigation. Coffee argues
that, functionally, MDL transfers often translate into stays that de-
crease the value of cases by the delay produced.14
The class action rule gives judges the official power to recognize
"representative" plaintiffs, and therefore to decide which lawyers will
appear on behalf of the class. While the MDL statute does not have
the same structure, the de facto judicial power is parallel: judges can
determine who the central lawyers for the plaintiffs will be. Judges ap-
point or anoint particular lawyers and give them the authority of
representation.
Coffee's discussion then turns to the lawyers who are members of
the plaintiffs' bar. He sketches how plaintiffs' attorneys compete for
control over litigation; he argues that defendants can generate a "re-
verse auction," in which defendants offer plaintiffs' lawyers agree-
ments that are beneficial to defendants, and courts sanction the
activity by approving the negotiations that occur on behalf of a group
of plaintiffs.' 5 For Coffee, the emergence of the "settlement class" is a
specific vehicle of unfairness, because the franchise of representation
(a "less than complete property right'u 6) granted to the plaintiffs' at-
torneys exists for settlement purposes only. The threat of trial is gone
when a settlement class is certified.
I1 I am paraphrasing here. See Coffee, Collusion Draft, supra note 1, at 32 ("Defend-
ants learn fast."); at 38 ("[t]he diffusion of legal knowledge is rapid within the intercon-
nected defense bar."); see also Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist
Perspectiv 80 CoRNmELL L. REv. 941, 954-55, 962.
12 Coffee, Collusion Draft, supra note 1, at 5.
13 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988).
14 Coffee, Collusion Draft, supra note 1, at 35.
15 Id. at 9; Coffee, Summary, supra note 1, at 853.
16 Coffee, Collusion Draft, supra note 1, at 15.
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According to Coffee, for plaintiffs' attorneys to negotiate aggres-
sively, they must have the power to threaten to break off negotia-
tions-to slam down the phone and say, "I'll see you in court." Once
everyone knows that no plaintiffs' lawyers can make such a claim, the
game is up: defendants hold all the cards. In short, by the creation
and approval of settlement class actions, defendants and courts dis-
able plaintiffs' attorneys collectively by empowering a subset of plain-
tiffs' lawyers whose goals are to negotiate settlements with defendants.
Shut out are those plaintiffs' lawyers who are willing to litigate and to
try cases.
II
ENLARGING THE FRAME OF REFERENCE: AGGREGATION AND
SETTLEMENT BEYoND RuLE 23
I share Coffee's and Marcus's interest in learning from the cases
that go under the nomenclature "mass tort class actions." But to de-
rive their import, I rely on sources in addition to those offered by
either author. Jack Coffee argues that procedure teachers are now
"historians of civil litigation"' 7-out of sync with contemporary reality.
Let me embrace rather than duck that accusation and show briefly the
utility of a focus larger than the current decade and a single set of
cases.1
8
A. The Quest for Aggregate Processing: From the 1960s to the
1990s
I am less surprised than Coffee and Marcus about current events,
and my lack of surprise comes from a different take on from whence
we come. A fuller contemplation of a bit of relatively recent civil pro-
cedure history explains why.
As Marcus and Coffee both note,19 in the early 1960s, when the
Advisory Committee drafters were framing their rule on class actions,
their focus was not on mass torts (in those days often called "mass
accidents"), but rather on other cases: securities or antitrust claims,
civil rights desegregation suits, and certain kinds of property disputes,
17 Id. at 17.
18 My comments here relate to my work on the interrelationships between class ac-
tions and other forms of aggregation. See Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation', supra note 7;
Resnik, Curtis & Hensler, Individuals Within the Aggregate supra note 9.
Peter Schuck's commentary on the "common law evolution" of mass tort litigation also
looks at these issues over a period of time. Schuck, supra note 11, at 947-48. As I broaden
the discussion, I want also to echo Roger Cramton's concern that, even within a focus
limited to mass tort class actions, we may fail to distinguish kinds of cases and settlement
agreements that merit differing appraisals of their overall legitimacy, fairness, and ethics of
a decision in a specific case. Cramton Memorandum of Sept. 19, 1994, supra note 3.
19 Marcus, supra note 1, at 872; Coffee, Collusion Draft, supra note 1, at 53.
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such as those involving competing claims to an insurance or other
fund. The drafters were not oblivious to the relationship between
mass accidents and class actions. Rather they decided, affirmatively,
to "keep [mass accidents] out."20
Why close that door? As I read the archival memoranda among
the committee members who, between 1963 and 1964, formulated the
language that became the 1966 class action rule, they had several ob-
jections to inclusion of mass torts within the class action framework.21
One concern was about individual autonomy, a theme that echoes
through the papers for this conference. 22 As Kaplan explained in a
memorandum in January of 1963, an individual tort plaintiff had an
interest in "pursuing his own litigation in his own way in a forum of
his own selection."23 Whereas in other areas of law, individual control
seemed less pressing, in the context of tort litigation, individual au-
thority and control appeared particularly important. Tort law had
conceptualized injuries done to an individual's body as specific and
personal. Further, under the Erie doctrine, federal law required the
application of state substantive norms. Thus, a related but distinct
point was an assumption that, even if one were to group mass accident
20 Letter from Benjamin Kaplan, Reporter for the Advisory Committee, to John P.
Frank 2 (Feb. 7, 1963), micofidhed on CIS No. CI-6312-32 (Congressional Info. Serv.) [here-
inafter Kaplan Letter of Feb. 7, 1963]. This research and its limits are detailed in Resnik,
From 'Cases" to "Litigation" supra note 7, at 9-14 & n.17. The archival material is now col-
lected, on microfiche, by the Congressional Information Service, see CIS Records of the
U.S.Judicial Conference, Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedure 1935-1988, No.
CI-6312-32 (1991 Congressional Info. Serv.) for the Feb. 7th letter, referred to above [here-
inafter CIS Judicial Conference Records].
21 Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation" supra note 7, at 9-14. For this discussion, I rely
on correspondence between Benjamin Kaplan (the Harvard law professor who was then
the reporter and is now ajustice in Massachusetts) and other committee members, on the
committee's memoranda, and on published essays by Professor Kaplan about Rule 28.
22 See, e.g., Coffee, Collusion Draft, supra note 1, at 53 (stating that the drafters of Rule
28 believed that "'mass accident' cases were ordinarily not appropriate for class action
treatment because of the likely presence of significant questions (such as individual causal-
ity) that would affect the individual in the class in different ways"); Marcus, supra note 1, at
889-90 (noting a "nagging sense that the uniquely personal nature of the claims compro-
mised [in mass tort class actions] should matter;" that opt-out provisions in these cases
"properly signal[ ],a serious concern with ensuring that [claimants] understand what they
are giving up in settlements like the ones recently approved," and that "courts should be
singularly sensitive to the adequacy of notice in mass tort class actions"); Schuck, supra note
11, at 964 (citing "individual interests" and "claimant autonomy" as reasons for praising
generous opt-out provisions in mass tort settlement); Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the
Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 80 CoRn, oLL L. REv. 1045, 1138-47 (1995).
23 CISJudicial Conference Records, supra note 20, No. CI-6313-58 (Topic EE: Modifi-
cation of Rule 23 of Class Actions (Summary Statement), enclosed in Memorandum by
Benjamin Kaplan to the Advisory Committee, at EE-8); Resnik, From "Cases" to "Liigtion'
supra note 7.
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cases together, they would "degenerate in practice into multiple law-
suits separately tried."
24
Yet another theme that emerged was the absence of a need for
class treatment. As Kaplan explained: "it would strain interpretation
to say that particular actions by injured parties in a mass tort will
[quoting a part of the proposed criteria for class actions] 'impair or
impede the ability of the other members to protect their interests;'
th [is] clause is redolent of claims against a fund."25 In other words, in
the 1960s, the drafters did not envision mass accidents as likely to
prompt similarly situated plaintiffs into a competition against each
other for a limited quantum of defendants' assets.
Implicit in other of Kaplan's discussions of Rule 23 is another
form of the "no need" argument, one based on the view that mass tort
plaintiffs have no need for class actions because they were not the
kind of litigants whom Kaplan and the Committee were trying to em-
power. When Kaplan discussed then new Rule 23, he explained it was
intended to enable litigation;26 tort plaintiffs did not need that extra
boost because they already had access to legal services by way of con-
tingency fee arrangements.
Thirty years ago, experienced litigators, academics, and judges as-
sumed that tort litigation (even that involving hundreds of people in
the same accident) consisted of cases that were specific and discrete
and in which defendants' relevant resources were not limited. Fur-
ther, these lawyers and judges assumed that the financing mechanism
of the contingent fee created sufficient economic incentives for the
24 CISJudicial Conference Records, supra note 20, No. CI-6313-87 (Topic EE: Modifi-
cation of Rule 23 of Class Actions (Summary Statement) enclosed in Memorandum by
Benjamin Kaplan to the Advisory Committee, at EE-27); Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation;
supra note 7. Kaplan raised concerns about individual liability and damages, perhaps im-
plicitly alluding to assumptions predicated on Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938). See Marcus, supra note 1, at 873-74 (discussing the different rules of law that would
have to be applied).
25 Kaplan Letter of Feb. 7, 1963, supra note 20, at 2 (quoting a part of the proposed
criteria for class actions).
26 Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatoy Note, The Class Action-A Symposium, 10 B.C. INDUS. &
COMM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969) (Class actions would "provide means of vindicating the
rights of groups of people who individually would be without effective strength to bring
their opponents into court at all."). Marvin Frarikel quoted Kaplan as saying that the class
action's "historic mission [was] taking care of the smaller guy." Marvin E. Frankel, Amended
Rule 23 from aJudge's Point of View, 32 A.B.A. ANTrmusT LJ. 295, 299 (1966). Consequently,
according to Kaplan, "where the stake of each member bulks large and his will and ability
to take care of himself are strong," class treatment was not necessary. Benjamin Kaplan,
Continuing Work of The Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(I), 81 HAiv. L. RFv. 356, 391 (1967).
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plaintiffs' tort bar to litigate such cases, and that procedural rules were
not needed to enhance claimant access.2 7
So what? Why should Coffee and Marcus care about this history?
Coffee and Marcus both argue that the world of litigation is changing
rapidly; they might use evidence from the Advisory Committee in part
to make their point-that only thirty years ago very astute observers of
the procedural landscape saw a world of individual litigants while to-
day we see their commonality. More importantly, Coffee and Marcus
should use this history for two other purposes. First, it provides a cau-
tionary note: we too need to be humble about knowing where we are
in the story, let alone what we should predict. Second, this history
forms a challenge; to capture not only what is happening now but also
to explain what forces caused the shift in perceptions. How could the
lawyers and judges who comprised the 1960s Advisory Committee
have seen these cases as inappropriate for class treatment-yet we,
only thirty years later, see them as a large undifferentiated whole, to
be disposed of via lump sum treatment whenever possible? How did
mass torts become class actions? How did the idea of limited funds
take hold? How did judges fasten on global settlements as the appro-
priate response?
As a commentator, I do not see my role as only raising questions;
let me sketch a bit of an answer.28 A key element in this aggregation
story (one missed when the lens is focused on class actions) is that
since the 1960s, a good many mass torts proceeded as de facto class
actions, grouped together under a variety of rules, both formal and
informal, that enabled aggregating claims and parties. To identify as
formative those court opinions in the 1980s and 1990s that granted or
upheld class certifications of mass torts is to miss a world of practice.
29
27 Of course, the analysis is more complex, nuanced, and variable, and the problems
of divining "framers' intent" more complex. See Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation", supra
note 7, at 15.
For discussion of subsequent events that make tort plaintiffs' access inadequate, see
David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Viuion of the
Tort System, 97 HARv. L. Rxv. 849, at 907-08 (1984) (arguing that contingency fee arrange-
ments were insufficient to counter the resources of defendants and that aggregation was
needed for mass torts to empower those kinds of plaintiffs as well).
28 For further discussion of these points, see Resnik, Curtis & Hensler, Individuals
Within the Aggregat supra note 9; Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation", supra note 7.
29 Cf Coffee, Collusion Draft, supra note 1, at 53 n.70 (referring to "important mile-
stones in this change in judicial attitude" from the 1980s). In my view, the milestones were
the practice, and the opinions are the acknowledgement of that practice. As discussed
infra, because of the important role played by multidistrict litigation ("MDL"), Coffee's
assertions about the role defendants have played need to be tested not only in the context
of class actions, but also in the context of MDLs. For example, as an empirical matter, does
MDL aggregation occur only when defendants sign on? Is a particular defendants' agree-
ment (manufacturers, as contrasted with insurance companies) central and others subsidi-
ary? Or is Coffee's observation of defendants' interest in aggregation as key to obtaining
class certification limited to class actions themselves? See, e.g., In re Asbestos Prods. Liab.
19951 925
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In practice, courts began in the late 1960s and 1970s to develop a
variety of means to aggregate parties and claims. The doctrine of a
decade later-that mass torts may be certified under Rule 23 as class
actions and certified for settlement-followed this practice. (By the
way, therein may also be a general "rule" of procedural rulemaking,
that rules often codify what at least some judges, lawyers, and litigants
have been doing for some time.30)
I will not here recount in detail the many means of consolidation
used by lawyers and judges. Briefly, methods include rule-based tech-
niques, such as consolidation by Rule 42 and by the appointment of a
special master under Rule 53 to superintend a series of officially dis-
crete cases, as well as informal mechanisms, such as lawyers who nego-
tiate "block" settlements of a stable of cases or judges who issue a
single pretrial order blanketing a series of cases.3 ' As Coffee and Mar-
cus correctly identify, federal judges have played a key role in class
action mass torts. Federal judges have played such a role, however,
not only in the last ten years but for the last half century-and not
only via Rule 23 but by reliance on other procedural rules and statutes
as well as on devices of their own invention.
In 1949, federal judges became increasingly concerned with what
were then called "protracted" cases of which antitrust litigation was
then a prime example. Whether concerned about antitrust litigation
(in the 1950s) or asbestos litigation (in the 1990s), the judicial re-
sponses, decades apart, have been similar. In both eras, ChiefJustices
created special committees of judges to make recommendations.
When, more than forty years ago, ChiefJustice Vinson appointed the
Litig., No. VI, 771 F. Supp. 415, 416-17 (J.P.M.L. 1991) (transfer supported by 30 defend-
ants and 17,000 plaintiffs-14,000 of which were represented by 50 lawyers-and opposed
by 454 defendants and 5200 plaintiffs).
30 Another example comes from the recent debate about mandatory disclosure and
the Federal Rules. The 1993 amendments to Federal Rule Civil Procedure 26, requiring
disclosure of information unless a district court opts out of those provisions, is an example
of a federal rule that codifies a practice already in place in some district courts:
The rule is based upon the experience of district courts that have required
disclosure of some of this information through local rules, court-approved
standard interrogatories, and standing orders.... While far more limited,
the experience of the few state and federal courts that have required pre-
discovery exchange of core information such as is contemplated in Rule
26(a) (1) indicates that savings in time and expense can be achieved....
FED. R. Civ. P. 26, advisory committee's note (1993). See Lauren K. Robel, Grass Roots
Procedure: Local Advisory Groups and the Civil fstice Reform Act of 1990, 59 BROOK. L REv. 879,
903 & n.133 (1998) ("Twenty-one courts had adopted mandatory disclosure provisions at
the time that the report was written.").
31 For details, see Resnik, =rom "Cases" to "Litigation", supra note 7, at 25-39, and
DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS: THE CHALLENGE OF MASS Toxic
TORTS 94-97 (ICJ, RAND 1985).
926 [Vol. 80:918
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committee on "Procedure in Anti-trust and Other Protracted Cases,"3 2
the committee concluded that protracted cases "might threaten the
judicial process itself."3 3 The proposed judicial response was to take
control. Similarly, in 1990, ChiefJustice Rehnquist appointed a com-
mittee on asbestos and that group, in turn, urged both congressional
action to create a national forum for asbestos cases and judicial reli-
ance on aggregate methods as interim measures.34
Events over the past three decades, including today's "settlement
class actions," provide evidence of these increasing efforts by the judi-
ciary to take control. In the 1950s, Judge Murrah's committee devel-
oped a "Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of
Protracted Cases."3 5 In the 1960s, the judiciary worried about 1800
separate federal filings, brought by the United States government
claiming that electrical equipment manufacturers violated the anti-
trust laws.3 6 Soon thereafter, the Judicial Conference went to Con-
gress and asked for authority to consolidate cases from different
federal district courts. The result in 1968 Oust two years after the class
action revisions were made) was the multidistrict litigation ("MDL")
statute.3 7
32 Committee to Study Procedure in Anti-Trust and Other Protracted Cases, Procedure
in Anti-Trust and Other Protracted Cases, 13 F.R.D. 62 (1953) [hereinafter Protracted Cases].
33 Id. at 64.
34 See Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation, Summary of the Report of the Judi-
cial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation 3 (Mar. 1991) (on file with
author) ("The committee firmly believes that the ultimate solution should be legislation
recognizing the national proportions of the problem... and creating a national asbestos
dispute resolution scheme that permits consolidation of all asbestos claims in a single fo-
rum-whether judicial or administrative-with jurisdiction over all defendants and appro-
priate assets."); see also id. at 4 (If Congress did not do so, "the federal judiciary must itself
act.... ."); id. at 36 (urging legislation to permit "collective trials of asbestos cases"). But see
id. at 41-43 (Separate Dissenting Statement ofJudge Thomas F. Hogan) (acknowledging
"national crisis involving asbestos litigation," but arguing against collective trials as "radi-
cal," "novel," and "constitutionally suspect;" and arguing in favor of the Black Lung
model).
35 Alfred Murrah, Foreword to Proceedings of the Seminar on Protracted Cases, 21 F.R.D. 395
(1957); Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases, 25
F.R.D. 351 (1960). See Resolutions Adopted at the Seminar on Protracted Cases, 23 F.R.D.
614, 615-16 (1958) ("The judge assigned should at the earliest moment take actual control
of the case and rigorously exercise such control throughout the proceedings in such
case.").
36 In fiscal year 1962, when those 1800 cases were filed, the federal civil docket had a
total of 61,836 civil filings. ANNUAL REPORT OF THiE DiRtcrOR OF THE ADMINISTAWTIVE OF-
FICE OF THE UNrTED STATES COURTS 196, tbl. C2 (1962). Thus, these cases were just under
three percent of federal civil filings. ChiefJustice Warren appointed Judge Alfred P. Mur-
rah as the Chair of the Coordinating Committee for Multiple Litigation of the United
States District Courts. Phil C. Neal & Perry Goldberg, The Electrical Equipment Antitrust
Cases: NoveljudicialAdministration, 50 A.BA.J. 621, 623 (1964). Nine federal judges super-
vised discovery, nationwide, in an effort to generate uniform pretrial orders. Id.
37 In 1964, the Judicial Conference requested statutory authority to consolidate and
transfer cases; in 1968 Congress responded with the MDL statute, which provided for ag-
gregation of lawsuits within the federal courts. See In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F.
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While technically these cases are only consolidated for pretrial
practices, functionally MDL is the end point of many cases.3 8 Since
the beginning of MDL, it has been used as a means of dealing with
and disposing of large accidents and, more recently, of some product
liability cases. Given current information,3 9 it appears that in the first
six years of the MDL, about a quarter of the MDL litigations certified
Supp. 484, 498-502 (J.P.M.L. 1968) (excerpts of Report of the Coordinating Committee on
Multiple Litigation recommending new § 1407 to Title 28); Note, Consolidation of Pretrial
Proceedings Under Froposed Section 1407 of the Judicial Code: Unanswered Questions of Transfer
and Review, 33 U. CHI. L REv. 558, 559-65 (1966) (reviewing the judicial Conference pro-
posal); H.R. REP. No. 1130, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-10 (Feb. 28, 1968) (reviewing congres-
sional proposal).
38 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1988) ("Civil actions involving one or more common ques-
tions of fact... may be transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial
proceedings."). As of the late 1980s, less than one fifth of the cases brought within the
MDL rubric were sent back to the originating court; most were disposed of by the MDL.
Patricia D. Howard, A Guide to Mulidistrict Litigation, 124 F.R.D. 479, 480 (1989) (2600 out
of 16,700 total actions remanded; "great success of the transferee judges in terminating by
settlement, summary judgment, or other type of dismissal" cases assigned to them). As of
1977, according to judge Weigel, that remand rate was five percent. See Stanley A. Weigel,
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Transferor Courts and Transferee Courts, 78 F.R.D.
575, 583 (1978).
The remand data should be used with caution. In the form available to me, I do not
know the rate of remand per year or much about which cases are remanded and why.
Furthermore, a resolution of large block of cases, such as the more than 25,000 asbestos
cases, can affect such cumulative data. Another factor is the rate at which litigants consent
to trial by the MDL judge, about which I also lack data.
39 As of 1994, more than 1043 petitions have come before the Judicial Panel on Mul-
tidistrict Litigation. MULTIDISTRIcr AUTOMATED TRACKING SYSTEM: CITATIONS SUMMARY 45
(provided Oct. 19, 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter MDL CITATIONS LIST].
Through September 30, 1994, 63,321 cases cumulatively have been transferred under that
rubric. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDIsTRICr LITIGATION, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTIDIS-
TRier LITIGATION: CUMULATIVE FROM SEPTEMBER 1968 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 1994 (1994)
(on file with author) [hereinafter MDL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS).
Of the 222,509 pending cases in the federal district courts as of September, 1993, the
37,002 cases subjected to MDL treatment represented 16.6% of the federal docket. ADMIN-
IsTRATIVE OFF. OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, UNITED STATES COURTS: SELECTED REPORTS
AI-87 tbl. C-6, 55 tbl. S-10 (1993) (on file with author) [hereinafter AO SELECTED
REPORTS].
Here, both thanks and a caveat are in order. The Office of the Clerk of the MDL
Panel and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts keep data on MDL. My
thanks to Patricia Howard, Clerk of the Judicial Panel, and Robert A. Cahn, Executive
Attorney of the Judicial Panel, for assistance in obtaining the data relied upon in this Com-
ment. While some information on the kinds of cases in which MDL is proposed is avail-
able, one cannot learn much about the interaction between MDL and class actions. For
example, data identify MDL cases in which class action allegations are made, but not those
in which judges certify class actions. Further, the information provided in the text is based
on interpreting data listing the numbers and kinds of cases, which we (my research assist-
ants and I) have characterized as mass torts or other kinds of actions and then counted by
hand. Other interpretations of these data may well be available. To illustrate-the Cita-
tions List labels "type of action" by a two- or three-letter designation plus a shortened title
(e.g., "Ford Bronco I"). We added the numbers of "AD" (air disaster), "CD" (common
disaster), and "PL" (products liability) cases. Thus, all numbers and percentages are de-
rived by us and not the MDL Panel. Another source of information is an ongoing study by
Federal Judicial Center researchers. See Thomas E. Willging, Laurel L. Hooper, and Rob-
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were mass torts.40 In the following ten years, about a third of the cases
certified were mass torts.41 Thus, we know that mass torts (both prod-
ucts and accidents) are common in MDLs, 42 and that like Rule 23,
MDL functions to aggregate cases and parties,43 which in turn helps to
propel judges toward global settlements. One can also see the interac-
tion of class action and MDL status; in four of the last five years, half
of the cases certified as MDLs included class action allegations.44
ertJ. Niemic, Preliminary Report on Time Study Class Action Cases (Feb. 9, 1995). That
study is not addressed to MDL but to class actions.
40 From 1968, when it came into being, until 1975, the MDL panel transferred 168
litigations for consolidated pretrial treatment, including (by our count) 42 mass accident
litigations (mostly air crashes) and three products liability cases (Dalkon, Celotex
"technifoam" (house insulation) and a design defect/personal injury products liability liti-
gation based on a faulty light plane engine). Thus, about a quarter were torts. Of those 46
litigations, two included cases requesting class action certification.
Of nontort MDLs in the same period, almost 61% (75 out of 123) included class alle-
gations. Of MDL antitrust and securities cases, about three quarters (74%- 37 out of 50
antitrust and 28 of 38 securities cases) included class allegations. All of the five employ-
ment MDL actions included class allegations. MDL CITATIONS lsr, supra note 39, at 1-9.
41 From 1975 until 1985, the MDL Panel transferred 236 MDL litigations, including
64 mass accidents (air crashes, falling buildings, fires), and six products liability cases. In
other words, a total of 70 litigations, or almost one-third of the MDL docket (almost 30%),
were torts during that 10-year period. Additionally, within that time period, four of the 64
accidents (a bit more than 6%) and three of the six products cases also included class
action allegations. That is, seven of 70, or 10%, included class action allegations. Id.
Turning to non-tort MDLs from 1975-1985, 80 of 166 nontort MDLs (about 48%)
included class action allegations, including 26 out of 47 antitrust suits (just over 55%), 44
out of 69 MDL securities suits (almost 64%) and three out of five employment suits in-
cluded class actions.
Over the last nine years, from 1986 until October 1994, when considering tort MDLs
as compared to other MDLs in this period, class allegations climb in the tort cases and
decline a bit in nontort cases-possibly reflecting the increased use of class actions in torts.
Specifically, the MDL Panel transferred 230 litigations, of which 42 (or a bit more than
18%) were torts. Of those 42 cases, 25 were accidents and 17 were products cases. Within
those 42, 13 (about 31%) included class action allegations. Among those 42 tort litiga-
tions, 8% (two of 25) of the accident litigations included class action allegations, whereas
70% (12 of 17) of the products cases included such allegations. Id.
For the same period, 73 out of 188 (about 39%) of nontort MDLs included class alle-
gations, including nine out of 23 antitrust suits (just over 39%), 39 out of 71 securities
actions (almost 55%) and four out of six employment cases.
42 See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITuTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDA-
TIONS A AtNALysis 59 n.27 (1994) [hereinafter ALI COMPLEX LITIGATION] (listing MDLs
and mass torts); see also Howard, supra note 38, at 480 (giving as examples of MDLs 1600
swine flu cases, 1100 Dalkon Shield cases, and 1100 Bendectin cases).
43 See e.g., MICHAEL GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFEcTs: THE CHALLENGE OF MASS
Toxic SuBsTANcEs LITIGATION Ch. 15 (forthcoming 1995) (concluding that in the MDL
there was a "de facto 23(b) (3) class action") (manuscript on file with author).
44 MDL CrrATIONS lasT, supra note 39, at 36-45. Specifically, as of October 1994, 25
MDIs have been transferred, of which nine include class allegations. In 1993, 14 of 24
MDLs transferred included class allegations; in 1991, 15 of 25 included class allegations,
and in 1990, 13 of 27 included class allegations. The "outlier" year was that of 1992, in
which seven of the 31 MDLs transferred included class allegations. In each of these years
except 1994, two to three of the cases that were transferred and that included class allega-
tions were product liability cases. As of this writing, four products liability cases are in-
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One interpretation of these data is that, before class actions were
as frequent in torts as they are today, MDL created a place for consoli-
dation and aggregate treatment. While multidistrict litigation is and
was an occasional event, it was a means by which judges and lawyers
gained familiarity with working with tort victims in groups. In the
1980s, judges and lawyers had a second forum in which to learn about
group processing of tort victims-the bankruptcy court. Key events in
the history of aggregate tort litigation are the bankruptcies ofJohns-
Manville, manufacturer of asbestos, 45 and of A.H. Robins, manufac-
turer of the Dalkon Shield.46
Given the different techniques for aggregation, one question is
whether multiple means of aggregating tort victims will continue to be
used or whether a particular form (MDL, or class certification, or
bankruptcy) will predominate. For example, one could read the MDL
data to suggest that, since class action certification, and perhaps, the
use of bankruptcy, have become more popular, the need for MDL
treatment of mass torts may be declining.47 Obviously, other factors
affect the rate at which MDL status is sought and granted; a definitive
analysis needs to encompass a review of those other variables, such as
the decline in the 1980s of airline crashes, which have been a staple of
the MDL Panel.48 The answers to such questions (about whether, in
practice, lawyers see differences or can use the two forms to strategic
advantage) await further developments.
In theory, all of these different procedures are distinct. Take
MDLs and class actions for example. MDLs were designed "only" to
consolidate already pending cases, and "only" for the pretrial process.
The MDL statute was billed as an effective mechanism for responding
to cases already on the judicial plate. In contrast, as the class action
drafters have instructed us, the class mechanism sought to enable the
bringing of claims not already filed. But before one thinks of MDLs as
only a managerial move, remember that MDLs function as temporary
cluded and four (including Norplant contraceptives and a "carpet industry" products case)
are awaiting disposition by the panel. Id. at 45.
45 In reJoint S. & E. Dist. Asbestos Litig. (Keene), 14 F.3d 726 (2d Cir. 1993); In re
Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. (Findley), 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992) modified on reh'g,
993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993); Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988); In re
Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. (Findley), 878 F. Supp. 473 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1995).
46 RicHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW. THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD BANK-
RUvrCy 42-48 (1991).
47 Class action mass torts may "moot" the need for MDL practice unless lawyers are
able to file enough class actions in different districts so as to continue to prompt requests
for the MDL rubric-or unless other incentives are at work.
48 Thanks to Robert A. Cahn, Executive Attorney of the MDL Panel, for his helpful
input in interpreting MDL data. Memorandum from Robert A. Cahn to Judith Resnik
(Nov. 4, 1994) (on file with author).
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de facto mandatory class actions.49 Once a litigant's case becomes a
part of an MDL, that litigant cannot "opt out" during the pretrial
phase. Further, under the MDL rubric, trial judges may also appoint
lead counsel and plaintiff steering committees, transforming these at-
torneys into lawyers for a group, albeit lawyers with an even less de-
fined set of ethical obligations than the class action lawyer.5 0
What has become plain over the past two decades is that the two
aspects of aggregation, expediting and enabling, are not distinct but
interact. The impulse toward expeditious and economical handling
of pending cases not only prompts interest in the termination of
pending cases but also in cases coming down the pike. The futures
tort class action is an unsurprising evolution, emerging from practices
under both the class action rule and MDL, that have pushed leaders
of the bench and bar to seek ever more effective means of aggregate
processing.
The ALI Complex Litigation Project also responds to the lessons
learned from these past decades of practice.5' I demur from Richard
Marcus's description of the ALI Project as a "consolidation" mecha-
nism: 52 the ALI proposal includes a procedure termed a "notice of
intervention and preclusion,"-translated as requiring potential liti-
gants to join pending proceedings or risk preclusion from relitigating
the issues decided.53 Therefore, the ALI proposal moves beyond the
49 For a discussion of why MDLs were not accompanied by controversy similar to that
of class action Rule 23, see Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation', supra note 7, at 46-48.
50 For the problems of class action lawyers, see Lawrence M. Grosberg, Class Actions
and Client-Centered Decisionmaking, 40 SYRACUSE L REv. 709 (1989); Nancy Morawetz, Bar-
gaining, Class Reresentation, and Fairness, 54 OHIO ST. L. REv. 1 (1993); Deborah L. Rhode,
Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STA. L. REv. 1183 (1982).
In the MDL context, it is unclear whether lead counsel or plaintiff steering committee
lawyers have obligations to other plaintiffs' lawyers or to their clients. Courts have com-
mented about obligations of such lawyers to all plaintiffs, rather than to only those clients
who retained them. See, e.g., In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 888 F.2d 940,
942 (1st Cir. 1989) (quoting district court language about lead counsel's representation of
"all plaintiffs"); In reAgent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 223 (2d Cir. 1987)
("fiduciary duty" of lead counsel not to "overreach" in class fee application (quoting Lewis
v. Teleprompter Corp., 88 F.R.D. 11, 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1980))); In reAircrash Disaster at Mal-
aga, Spain, 769 F. Supp. 90, 91 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing "duties to plaintiffs" owed by lead
counsel). However, little case law addresses or expressly explains what duties that repre-
sentative capacity imposes. See, e.g., New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Gloucester
Envt'l Mgmt. Serv., 138 F.R.D. 421, 430 (D.N.J. 1991) ("Although the relationship between
Liaison Counsel and group members is not an attorney-client relationship, the conduct of
attorneys may nonetheless be guided by analogy to the Rules of Professional Conduct with
respect to fees and billing arrangements.") (foomote omitted).
51 The American Law Institute's Project on Complex Litigation (for which Arthur
Miller and Mary Kay Kane were the reporters) won final approval in May, 1993. ALI COM-
PLEX LTIGATION, supra note 42.
52 The ALI also described its work as "consolidation." Id.
53 A court may issue a "[niotice of intervention and preclusion to individuals who are
not yet parties to a consolidated action but whose joinder is deemed an integral part of
making a comprehensive adjudication of a complex litigation." Id. at 276-77. In other
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model of consolidation and starts to resemble class actions-enabling
the filing of new lawsuits. The ALI's Complex Litigation proposal cre-
ates a quasi-mandatory class action, in which non-parties may be pe-
nalized for staying on the sidelines and from which parties cannot opt
out.54 The difference between the ALI 1990s proposal and the 1966
class action proposal is that what the ALI terms efficiency appears par-
amount in its conception,55 whereas for at least some of the kinds of
class actions created by the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, enabling
access was the prime concern.
One issue is how far efficiency concerns take the ALI; it is not
clear whether the ALI proposal contemplates and/or approves of the
preclusion of "future" claims. 56 Whether or not the ALI has implicitly
words, a court may decide that the pending cases do not capture all the relevant partici-
pants, and request that individuals or groups file new lawsuits, referred to in the ALI report
as "unasserted claims." Id. at 277.
54 While the ALI provides some details on the form of notice and requires that non-
parties be informed of the nature of the claims, the right to intervene, and the penalties
and benefits that might attach, the ALI does not explain how to identify whom to notice.
It recommends that the court "should enlist the aid of the existing parties in locating
potential claimants." Id. at 300. The transferee court could, but need not, hold a hearing
on the issue. Id. at 302 n.32.
Should a potential intervenor not put him or herself forward, the penalty (intended
according to the comments to be "coercive rather than compulsory") is preclusion. Id. at
278 ("The nonparty effectively waives the opportunity to litigate the issues decided in the
consolidated action."). While the proposal keys preclusion to actual receipt of notice, it
also discusses "generalized notice" as well as an "individual notice"---making somewhat
unclear whether actual receipt is a touchstone of preclusion. Id. at 284.
55 To decide whether to invite such intervention, courts should consider the similarity
of actions and efficiency; consistency and litigant repose; and avoidance of undue preju-
dice, burden, or inconvenience. AL CoMPLEx LmGATON, supra note 42, at 289-90 n.22
(discussing cites for the proposition that parties have no absolute right to control their
own lawsuits). The ALI's focus on the courts' need to mop up all problems attempts to
meld the docket-clearing imperative with individual plaintiffs' rights.
56 Arguments are available from the report that "future" claimants could be covered.
For example, binding "futures" is consistent with the stated purposes of ALI's notice to
intervene: to have issues concluded "once and for all," to avoid "duplicative and possibly
inconsistent determinations," and to "promote a truly final decision of the underlying con-
troversy." Id. at 278-79; see also id. at 284 (The purpose is to achieve a "final and binding
result.").
On the other hand, the ALI describes the intervention procedure as inapplicable to
claims of "nonparties who are unknown ... or of claims that have not yet arisen." Id. at
279. But the questions are when has a claim arisen, and whether future plaintiffs are "un-
known." Further, who fits the description of a nonintervening party who "knew or should
have known" of the pending lawsuit? Id. at 285.
The report's discussion of notice supports an interpretation that it does not sanction
"futures." The ALI urges courts to send such notice to "known" individuals. However, the
ALI also recognizes the need to provide some forms of generalized notice. Perhaps such
"group notice" could encompass some claimants who do not know of their own injuries.
Id. at 299 (when the number of individuals to be noticed is great, some form of general or
"group notice rather than using an individual mailing" may be available). The ALI also
refers to "some of the innovative techniques used in class actions for identifying absent
claimants." Id. at 300 (citing HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS
AcrioNs 2d § 8.44 (1985)). Newberg proposed a series of methods for "absent class mem-
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endorsed future class actions and settlement classes, the recommenda-
tions of the ALl, combined with the MDL statute, the use of bank-
ruptcy, and the class action rules all support a general description of
current law: while (in the words of the ALI) individual control over
litigation is both relevant and "weighty," particularly in the mass tort
context,57 individual interests are not "immutable."58 That the ALI
project is styled as "merely an aggregation of individual suits," 59 (a la
MDL) bespeaks ongoing rhetorical commitment to individual process-
ing. That the ALl proposes a power of consolidation that includes the
ability to invite intervention, all in the search for finality and binding
conclusive results, makes such consolidated actions look a lot like
their cousins, class actions.60
It is this history that explains what Marcus calls the transforma-
tion of the class action from "dinosaur" to "phoenix,"61 but the history
makes the metaphor less viable. No sudden transformation has oc-
curred. Over the past thirty years, an understanding of the utility of
aggregate litigation has emerged that explains the 1966 class action's
appeal in the 1990s. Today's interest in class actions stems in part
from a vision of them as efficient, particularly in arenas like mass torts,
in which judges are confident that, while using a class may enable new
filings that would not otherwise have been brought,62 class actions
bers;" many of the methods assume one could, with energy and resources, locate these
individuals (such as by hiring "professional locator services"). According to Newberg,
"[w]hen neither names nor addresses of potential members are known, then publicity
through mass media television and radio spots .... will have positive effects." 2 HERBERT B.
NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLAss ACrIONS 3d § 8.44 (1994). That discussion
may prompt a view that only those with current injuries are covered by the ALI proposal.
57 ALI CoMPLEX LrIGATION, supra note 42, at 46 (citing Roger Transgrud, joinder Al-
tematives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CoRNEL L REV. 779 (1985)).
58 AL COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 42, at 46.
59 Id. at 287 (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940)). The AI project seeks to
distinguish itself from class actions in that, unlike preclusion in classes in which the central
question is the adequacy of representation, the Al project appears to rest its preclusion
upon the court's role to "invite participation" by giving notice. The ALI project does not
discuss, however, the preclusive consequences of nonparticipation when a generalized no-
tice is given.
Other questions emerge, including how such participation functions in practice. The
AU Project seems to anticipate that its complex litigation will be in the hands of a lawyers'
executive committee or management committee. Id. at 294 (§ 3.01, comment d). Thus, a
set of counsel would play the central role, with individual attorneys playing minor roles. Id.
at 50-51 n.18 (discussing cooperation among lawyers).
60 The reporter comment does note the "family similarity between class actions and
consolidated actions," distinguishing them by the fact that plaintiffs' lawyers create the
scope of class actions, whereas under the ALI version, the courts would create the enlarged
scope of consolidated actions. Id. at 287 n.11.
61 Marcus, supra note 1, at 907.
62 I do not want to ignore the "enabling" aspect of courts' work. For example, at the
time of the Dalkon Shield bankruptcy filing, some 15,000 tort lawsuits had been filed
against A. H. Robins. Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, UnderstandingMass Personal
Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK L. REV. 961, 983 (1993). By virtue of a
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also serve as a means of processing the expected high quantity of
claims that will be brought individually.
If one looks at the class action rule as the lens through which pro-
cedural and substantive developments have occurred, one misses the
developments that have occurred through and because of other
means of aggregation. Indeed, it is the historical backdrop of interest
in and acculturation to aggregation that is key to the class action's use
in the cases about which Coffee and Marcus write and in the expan-
sion of class actions towards "futures." Moreover, it is not only the
federal civil litigation docket that shapes the permissibility of aggre-
gate processing. Changes in two other arenas of decisionmaking over
the past three decades demonstrate the eclipse of individualized adju-
dicative processes in areas of law that, like tort litigation, relate to indi-
viduals in physical material terms.
Take first the sentencing guidelines. Prior to the adoption of
guidelines, the law expressed a commitment to individual sentencing
that was based on the particulars of each case, with a specific defen-
dant who had committed a particular offense and who stood before a
given judge. No more. Today's federal sentencing is decided by reli-
ance on a grid, on which offense and defendant are both coded. As-
sessing variables about the kind of offense and prior history, ajudge is
told to impose a sentence within a given range, such as fifty-seven to
seventy-one months. 63 Or Congress mandates ten years.64
Another example is the social disability system. As of 1992, 860
administrative law judges listened to individual complaints of disabil-
ity; some 250,000 cases are filed annually.65 Those judges too rely on
mass notice procedure relying on media advertising in that bankruptcy proceeding, about
300,000 additional claims were filed. Herbert M. Kritzer, Public Notification Campaigns in
Mass Litigation: The Dalkon Shield Case, 13 JUSTICE SysTEmJ. 220, 223 (1988-89) (of these,
some 193,000 filings were deemed valid); See also MARK PETERSON & MOLLY SELVIN, RESO-
LUTION OF MASS ToRrs: TOWARD A FRAMEwORK FOR EVALUATION OF AGGREGATIVE PROCE-
DURES 29 (ICJ, RAND, 1988) (over 200,000 valid filings). The other side of enabling,
however, is overclaiming, the filing of nonmeritorious claims made easily available by ready
access. Holding aside that problem, the comparison reveals that the tort system did not
provide an avenue for a host of women who claimed they had been injured.
63 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
270 (West 1994).
64 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A) (1988), which imposes such a sentence on any-
one intentionally or knowingly manufacturing, distributing, dispensing, or possessing spec-
ified quantities of listed "controlled substances:" one kilogram of heroin, five kilograms of
cocaine or coca leaves, 50 grams of a cocaine base-containing substance, 100 grams of PCP,
10 grams of LSD, 400 grams of N-phenyl-N propanamide, one kilogram of marijuana, or
100 grams of methamphetamine; see also UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SPECIAL
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINALJUS-
TICE SYSrEM 10 (Aug. 1991) (approximately 100 federal offenses then carried mandatory
minimum sentences).
65 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND RE-
PORTS 1992, at 786 nn.24 & 26.
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a grid to standardize both the form of complaint and the mode of
judgment. Why use this example? As I read Jack Coffee's argument
that "one must... recognize the likelihood of a reluctance on the
part of trial judges to allocate scarce judicial time and resources to
processing a hoard of repetitive individual cases on behalf of desper-
ately ill individuals,"6 6 I thought how aptly those words fit both the
disability claimants and the frequent delegation of social security cases
to magistrate judges.
67
In short, across the federal civil docket to the criminal docket,
and from there to the administrative docket, developments over the
last thirty years have yielded a societal comfort with the prospect of
judgments in some massed bureaucratic form, a judgment process
that looks very different from the imagined moment of individual
judgment paradigmatic of tort (and other) kinds of litigation.
68 Ag-
gregate processing, from settlement class actions (that beget rules of
decision that appear to violate Eri69) to disability grids, both expresses
and creates legitimacy for these modes of decisionmaking.
I am not arguing that the system is seamless or that the transition
has been complete. It is possible that comfort with administrative
processing is related to a perception that one will not be subjected to
it, that many do not imagine themselves disabled and thus within the
social security regime, or subject to criminal penalties. Further, jury
trials remain a frequently stated ideal. I was struck at a recent Ameri-
can Bar Association conference on the jury that few participants ex-
pressed negative feelings about the institution of the jury or sought its
abolition. 70
66 Coffee, Collusion Draft, supra note 1, at 6.
67 SeeJudith Resnik, Housekeeping. Nature and Allocation of Work in Federal Trial Courts,
24 GA. L REv. 909 (1990). For a discussion of the delegation of such cases by Article Im
judges to magistrates, see CARROLL SERON, THE ROLES OF MAGISTRATES: NINE CASE STUDIES
83-92 (1985); CARROLL SERON, THE ROLES OF MAGISTRATES IN FEDERAL DISTRI-T COURTS
(1983); CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS:
SUBORDINATE JUDGES 20, 61-62, 79-80, 87-88, 175-78 (1990); Carroll Seron, The Profeasional
Project of Parajudges: The Case of U.S. Magistrates, 22 L. & Soc'Y REv. 557 (1988).
68 Deborah R. Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989 U. ILL L.
Rv. 89, 91-92.
69 Marcus, supra note 1, at 872-73.
70 VEDWc. ASSESSING THE CIVILJURY SysTEM, (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993). Those who
voiced concerns include George Priest and Peter Schuck. See George L. Priest, Justifying the
Civil Jury, in VERDiCr: ASSESSING THE CrVL JURY SYSTEM, supra, at 103, 124, 131 (asking
"what good reasons are there for convening twelve citizens to determine damages in the
52.91 percent of civil cases where the most serious injury suffered by the plaintiff was a cut,
fracture, strain or bruise?" and suggesting that "the shift of routine litigation to the judicial
calendar will increase predictability and promote settlement"); Peter H. Schuck, Mapping
the Debate onJuiy Reforra, in VERDIcr: ASSESSING THE CVIL JURY SYSTEM, supra, at 306, 331
("Some attempt to rationalize the way in which damages for nonpecuniary losses are as-
sessed probably offers the greatest promise of meeting the legitimate concerns of the jury's
critics."); see also Schuck, supra note 11, at 977 (discussing the expansion ofjury availability
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While the rhetoric of individualization remains vital, the practice
has shifted. Courts now create mini-agencies to distribute funds
across a group of people, massed together by virtue of similar (but far
from identical) sets of injuries or exposures, or perhaps lining up in
some future, imaginary queue.71 These creations are deeply continu-
ous with a half century of developments towards more administrative
processing and less decisionmaking by judges involving individual
adversaries. 7
2
This overview helps to provide responses, not only to Coffee and
Marcus, but also to Carrie Menkel-Meadow's thoughtful questions
about whether we must "alter our ideals of individual justice to deal
with a world in which technology and modernity bring mass harms
that may require aggregate justice."73 The answer is that these ideals
have already been reshaped, not only in the context of mass disasters
but also in the context of mass problems, such as decisions about the
receipt of federal benefits and sentencing.
Another question is thus clarified: Given the rise of administra-
tive adjudication and aggregate decisionmaking in a variety of con-
texts, what is the vitality of an ideal of individual justice as exemplified
by access to an individual trial? In practice, I believe we are witnessing
the alteration of court-based individual adjudication-as it melds with
"alternative dispute resolution,"7 4 relocates in part to administrative
agencies, and increasingly emphasizes settlement.75 Yet another ques-
tion is whether Judge Weinstein is correct that the contemporary in-
novations are an attempt to "preserve the essence of our prior
under the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act and the refusal to turn the Federal
Employer Liability Act of 1908 into a workers' compensation system).
71 These facilities are often a melange, part administrative agency, part court, part
insurance agency. For analysis of when administrative responses are appropriate, see Rob-
ert L Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative Compensation Scheme,
52 MD. L. Rxv. 951 (1993).
72 WOLF HEm RAND & CARROLL SERON, RATIONAIUZINGJUSTICE (1990); see alsoJudith
Resnik, Procedural Innovations, Sloshing Over: A Comment on Deborah Henser, A Glass Half Full,
A Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation,
73 TEx. L. RExv. 1627 (1995).
73 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 10, at 1171.
74 Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudica-
tion, 10 OHIO ST.J. ON Disp. RESOL. 211 (1995) [hereinafter Resnik, Many Doors].
75 See generallyJudith Resnik, Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settle-
ment, and the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1471
(1994) (examining contemporary attitudes on the "utility and desirability of adjudication")
[hereinafter Resnik, WhoseJudgmentq; see also Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, 'Most Cases Set-
tle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1339, 1388-89 (1994)
(arguing that "[w]e simply don't know about the wider effects of judicial settlement
promotion").
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conceptual approach to the law,"7 6 or whether it is time to admit that
"our prior conceptual" approach has been largely abandoned.
B. In Search of Settlement: Judges as a "Limited Fund"
Let me move then from this point about a widespread phenome-
non of aggregate processing (exemplified by, but not exclusive to,
mass tort class actions and the claims facilities they spawn) to my next
point about the impulse towards settlement. Both Marcus and Coffee
note reliance by courts on the "limited fund" concept in Rule 23 as a
basis for certification of mass torts.77 As Marcus details, interesting
questions exist about exactly how limited those funds are; empirical
questions include the degree to which defendants have such limited
funds or are able to create the perception of limited funds and the
rate at which plaintiffs assert unmeritorious claims.
But it is not only defendants and plaintiffs who think in terms of
limited funds; the judges see themselves as a limited fund, a finite
resource. Here, again, a reminder based on history is in order. Fed-
eral judges have reported a fear of multiple, redundant, related ac-
tions overwhelming the courts since at least 1951, when (as noted
above) the committee chaired by Judge E. Barrett Prettyman warned
that "protracted" cases "might threaten the judicial process itself."7 8
Judicial interest thus flows not only towards aggregation but also to-
wards settlement. Over the past forty years, the judicial role has been
reformulated, creating the "managerial judge," now codified by
means of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and by the
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990.
79
76 WrNSTETN, supra note 2, at 1. Weinstein further argues that those ideals are not
"outmoded," but at the same time are not necessarily required in all kinds of cases. Id. at 2.
77 Marcus supra note 1, at 877-880; Coffee, Summary, supra note 1, at 855.
78 See Protracted Cases, supra note 32, at 64. For another example ofjudicial fear of
caseload increases, see Report of the Committee on Habeas Corpus Procedure Submitted to theJudi-
cial Conference of the United Stales (June 7, 1943) (available from the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts, habeas corpus microfiche subject file, fiche 1) (raising concerns
about the quantity of filings by prisoners);Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 837, 907-
909 (1984) (describing data on filings by prisoners and perceived effects). Stephen
Yeazell's history of the class action finds that courts aggregated cases for their own conven-
ience in medieval times. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GRoUP LITIGATION TO THE
MODERN CLASS ACnrON 75-85 (1987).
79 SeeJudith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HAv. L. REV. 374 (1982). As written in the
1930s, the Federal Rules allowed trial courts discretion to convene pretrial conferences.
FED. R. Clv. P. 16, in FEDERAL RuLEs OF CVIL PROCEDURE: ANALYZED AND ANNOTATED 40
(Harry Graham Baiter ed., 1938).
After judges advocated and undertook a more active role, the rules were amended.
The 1983 amendments required judges to schedule pretrial conferences; the topics to be
addressed included "the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to
resolve the dispute." FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c) (7) (1983). A decade later, in 1993 amendments,
Rule 16 was again amended, to revise the description of these "extrajudicial procedures"
(or ADR) by describing them as "special procedures to assist in resolving the dispute when
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As this mention of general civil rules and statutes illustrate, the
story that Coffee and Marcus sketch is not broad enough;judicial anx-
iety and interest in self-preservation are apparent in many places
across the federal docket.80 To the extent questions are being raised
about the wisdom of judicial responses to the sense of an unending
need of citizens for judgment, those questions should not be targeted
only at the creation of mass tort settlement class actions.
What the mass tort class action does is to make visible some forms
of settlement practice (not unique to that context) that Coffee finds
noxious and some forms of lawmaking that give Marcus pause for con-
cern. The questions (a good deal of them empirical) are whether the
settlement agreements in this arena are qualitatively different from
those increasingly common in other forms of litigation, whether the
third party effects are substantially more egregious, and whether the
judicial pressure for settlement is differently insistent.
For example, how many individual cases (tort and non-tort) are
filed with the view that plaintiffs' lawyers will in fact slam down a
phone and say, "I'll see you in court!"? In other words, Coffee's argu-
ment that mass torts are uniquely disabling of plaintiffs' attorneys may
be empirically untrue; plaintiffs' attorneys may often have a limited
mandate and limited powers, or may themselves decide that the finan-
cial rewards possible from trial (to either their clients or themselves)
do not merit the risks and investment of resources. Further, judges'
interest in settlement may also result in judicial insistence on the pur-
suit of settlement as a prerequisite to any further decisionmaking.
The empirical question here is about how the various programs for
alternative dispute resolution and the reemergence of proposals to
permit fee shifting for failure to settle8 l affect the capacity of plaintiffs
(or defendants) to insist on a trial. Turning to the third-party effects
that futures class actions implicate, how many agreements on settle-
authorized by statute or local rule." The Advisory Committee's note explains that the revi-
sion "describe[s] more accurately" procedures aside from "traditional settlement confer-
ences" that "may be helpful in settling litigation." FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c) (9) advisory
committee's note (1993). The 1993 amendments further detail thejudicial role in manag-
ing the pretrial process, controlling discovery, structuring trials, and helping parties to
settle cases;judges were also authorized to require parties or their representatives to be at
conferences or to be available by phone "to consider possible settlement of the dispute."
See United States Supreme Court, Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
146 F.R.D. 401, 427-431 (promulgated rule 16(c), effective Dec. 1, 1993) (Rule 16(c)); see
also the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. V 1993).
80 Coffee argues for the "unique context" of mass torts in which courts are self-inter-
ested. Coffee, Collusion Draft, supra note 1, at 3. Compare Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial
Preferences, Public Choice and the Rules of Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627 (1994); Janet
Cooper Alexander, Judges' Self-Interest and Procedural Rules: Comment on Macey, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 647 (1994).
81 See William W Schwarzer, Fee-Shiffting Offers ofJudgment-An Approach to Reducing the
Cost of Litigation, 76JuDICATURE 147 (1992).
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ment include the destruction of documents 2 or the vacatur of opin-
ions potentially available as precedent?
83
The list can go on, but the point should be clear. Jack Coffee has
found settlement-hungry judges in mass torts; Richard Marcus says he
has found law-making judges in settlement. Both insights are correct,
but those kinds of judges exist in other cases as well. The pursuit of
settlement may be most vivid, the scale more grand, the media more
able to capture it, but the phenomenon is not limited to these kinds
of cases, nor do only agreements in mass torts have third-party effects.
Moreover, the interest in settlement is not framed purely from a
fear of overload. The pursuit of settlement is fueled by disillusion-
ment with trial and adversarialism as well as by increased valuation of
consent as a predicate to resolution. Interest has waned in factfinding
as the predicate to action and in trial as the means of achieving fact
and transforming it to legal obligation. Aggregation has both height-
ened the visibility of these changing values and made the spectacle of
trial all the more awesome. The general problem is whether to ap-
plaud or bemoan the retreat from trial and the shift to an ideology of
consent and compromise. 84
III
CONCLUSION: QUESTIONS IN CONTEXT
The use of class actions in mass torts is a part of a societal move-
ment away from individual adjudication. Mass torts are but one of
several examples of aggregate decisionmaking, calling into question
the propriety of normative claims about "our system." As of 1995,
"our system" is one of dispute resolution in many fora, agencies,
courts, private settings, and places in between. Some of it is aggre-
gated, some of it individualized, to varying extents. Over a half cen-
tury, we have been shifting the venue of decisionmaking away from
courts and away from an individual litigant model. Adjudicatory and
related activities now occur in a variety of settings, with a range of
procedures. Within the federal system, individual decisionmaking is
often times not conducted by Article IIIjudges or by juries, but dele-
gated to magistrate and bankruptcy judges, to administrative law
judges, and to personnel at claims facilities.
82 See Court Secrecy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the House
Comm. on theJudiciay, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (May 17, 1990); Arthur R. Miller, Confidential-
ity, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HIARv. L. REv. 427 (1991).
83 See Resnik, WlhseJudgrnent?, supra note 75.
84 See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modem Civil Process, 1994
Wis. L. REv. 631; Susan S. Silbey & Austin Sarat, Dispute Processing in Law and Legal Scholar-
ship: From Institutional Critique to the Reconstruction of theJuridicial Subject, 66 DENY. U. L. R v.
437 (1989); HEYDEBRAND & SERON, supra note 72; Resnik, WhoseJudgment?, supra note 75;
Resnik, Many Doors, supra note 74.
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The interest in settlement of the mass torts subjected to class
treatment is also linked to a general shift in focus from an emphasis
on adjudicatory processes to conciliatory ones, from a focus on rights
to a focus on resolution. The challenge for those who write about
mass torts is to consider how and whether these cases raise distinctive
problems about aggregation and settlement, or whether the criticisms
leveled in this context should be directed more broadly to bemoan a
host of contemporary developments.
